Dean E. Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Company, a Corporation; Metropolitan Water District of Orem, A Public Corporation, and Orem City, A Municipal Corporation : Appellant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1969
Dean E. Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Company, a
Corporation; Metropolitan Water District of
Orem, A Public Corporation, and Orem City, A
Municipal Corporation : Appellant's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Edward W. Clyde and E.J. Skeen; Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal, No. 11345 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3476
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN E. PARK, 
Y.S. 
~LTA DITCH & CANAL COMPANY, a 
corporation; METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT OF OREM, a public corpora-
tion, and OREM CITY, a municipal cor-




An Appeal ff'.om the Judgment of the Fourth Diei&riet Cout 
for Utah County 
Honorable Joseph E. Ne11en, Judge 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
351 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
E. J. SKEEN 
522 Newhouse BuilcliJUr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
:~ .. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
KEITH E. TAYLOR 
Attorney for Defendant. and Respondent, 
Alta Ditch & Canal Company 
Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent, 
Metropolitan Water District of Orem 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
FILED 
JAN 1 7 1969 
H. VERNON WENTZ 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent, _ ··-·-·-···----·-···-·---····--·--·-----·· ---
Orem City Cle•k. Supreme Court, Utelt 
884 South State Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Statement of Kind of Case ··························o············ 1 
Disposition in Lower Court ...................................... 2 
Relief Sought on Appeal .. .......................................... 2 
Statement of Facts ...................................................... 2 
Statement of Points .................................................... 9 
Argument ································································~····· 10 
I. The Appellant is the Owner of a Right to Use 
His Proportionate Share of the Water of Alta 
Spring. .................................................................. 10 
2. The Holder of Stock in a Mutual Water Com-
pany is entitled to Receive His Proportionate 
Share of the Water and the Majority Hl!-s No 
Right Over His Objection to Sell, Exchange, 
or Otherwise Deprive Him of It. .................... 12 
3. Alta Did Not, By the Water Lease and Ex-
change Agreement Have Authority to Deprive 
the Appel1ant of His Right to Use Alta Spring 
'Vater 'Vithout His Consent ............................. 23 
4. Alta is Estopped From Interfering With the 
Appellant's \\Tater Supply ................................. 25 
l 
Page 
5. The Appellant Has a Valid and Enforceable 
Agreement with Orem for the Carriage of His 
Alta Spring Water. ---------··--------------·---------------·-- 28 
Conclusion .................................................................... 31 
AUTHORITY CITED 
19 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 613, Section 1078 27 
31 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 589, Section 114 .. 27 
CASES CITED 
Arnold v. G. & R. Association, 64 Utah 534, 231 
P. 622 ( 1924) ........................................................ 21 
Baird v. Upper Canal and Irrigation Co., 70 Utah 
57, 257 P. 1060 ( 1927) ........................................ 22 
Continental National Bank v. Minersville Reservoir 
and Irrigation Co., 73 Utah 243, 273 P. 502 
( 1928) ..................................................................... 15 
East River Bottom v. Boyce, 102 Utah 149, 128 
P.2d 277 ( 1942) .................................................... 13 
G~nola v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930 
( 1938) ---·····--·-----·-··········--······································ 16 
George v. Robison, 23 Utah 79, 63 P. 819 (1901) .. 21 
Gunnison-Fayette Canal Co. v. Gunnison Irrigation 
- Co., (Case No. 11209) not reported ................ 19 
In re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 P. 748 
( 1924) ························---·-···············------·················· 19 
11 
Page 
Ireton v. Idaho Irr. Co., 30 Idaho 310, 164 P. 687 .. 19 
Mary Jane Stevens Co. vs. First Nat. Bldg. Co., 
89 Utah 456, 57 P .2d 1099 ------------·--·--·····--------· 27 
Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 
40 Utah 126, 121 P. 592 (1911) ........................ 17 
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union 
Central Life Insurance Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 
P.2d 866 (1943) .................................................... 15 
St. George City v. Kirkland, et al,. 17 Utah 2d. 292, 
409 p .2d 970 ( 1966) ·····································-···· 17 
Strohecker v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 55 Nev. 
350, 34 P.2d 1076 ................................................ 27 
'V oodstone M. & T. Co. v. Dunsmore C. W. Co., 
47 Cal. App. 72, 190 P. 213 ................................ 20 
STATUTES CITED 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 100-1-10 .... 14 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 100-1-11 .... 14 
TEXTS CITED 
Pacific Digest._ Key 482 ................................................ 27 
Pomeroy' s Equity Jurisprudence, Fourth Edition, 
Vol. 2, Page 1680, Section 818 .......................... 27 
Pomeroy' s Equity Jurisprudence, Fourth Edition, 
Vol. 2, Page 1681, Section 819 ............................ 28 
111 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEANE. PARK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALTA DITCH & CANAL COMPANY, a 
eorporation; METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT OF OREM, a public corpora-
tion, and OREM CITY, a municipal cor-




STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to the appellant's water 
and ditch rights, evidenced by two shares of stock in Alta 
Ditch and Canal Company, a mutual irrigation company, 
against such company and against the Metropolitan 
\Yater Distriet of Orem and Orem City, claimants of the 
use of such water under lease and exchange agreements. 
Orem City counterclaimed for payment for water de-
livered to the appellant. 
1 
pISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court dismissed the amended complaint, 
holding that the appellant's only right against the Alta 
Ditch and Canal Company was as owner of two shares 
of st·ock, that the agreements between such Company 
and Metropolitan Water District of Orem were valid 
and that the appellant's water right was subject thereto. 
The court also held that the appellant had no right to use 
or maintain his pre.sent connection with the Orem City 
pipeline. Orem City's counterclaim for payment for 
water delivered to the appellant friom N ov·ember 1, 1962 
to October 1, 1967 was dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to reverse that part of the judg-
ment of the trial court denying to him a decree quieting 
his title to his proportionate share of the water of Alta 
Spring, and denying his right to carry his water in the 
Orem City pipeline. He seeks affirmance of that part of 
the judgment dismissing Orem City's counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Alta Ditch and Canal Company, a corporation, will 
be hereinafter ref erred to as ''Alta'' and the respondents 
Metropolitan Water District of Orem and Orem City will 
be hereinafter collectively ref erred to as ''Orem.'' A 
defunct corporation which preceded Alta will be referred 
to as "Old Alta". 
2 
Old Alta was incorporated in 1893 for the purpose of 
pooling the water rights of its stockholders for more 
convenient and efficient distribution of water. It was a 
typical, mutual irrigation type company. (Ex. 26). Its 
Charter expir·ed on May 16, 1943. (Ex. 26) . .A nnw ~"1·­
poration having the same name and same articles of 
incorporation was organized in 1946. (Ex. 7). The appel-
lant bought certificate No. 224 for two shares of stock 
in Old Alta from one Robert B. Calder in 1947. (Tr. 71). 
Calder's certificate was transferred from the certificate 
of Verena C. Crandall, No. 213, dated in 1945. (Ex. 13). 
This certificate was issued from certificate No. 202, dated 
November 4, 1943. (Ex. 13). Certificate No. 202 was 
issued from Certificate No. 195 which was elated Febru-
ary 20, 1943. (Ex. 13). 
In 1950, two years after the appellant purchased his 
certificate of stock, a decree was entered in a suit entitled, 
"Orem City vs. Alta Ditch and Canal Co., et al., filed in 
the District Court of Utah County which involved the 
question as to whether Orem City, a stockholder in Old 
Alta, was entitled to its proportionate share of the water 
of the same Alta Spring as that involved in this case. 
'l1he entire file is in evidence. (Ex. 3). It will be noted 
that Orem City won its case and the court quieted its 
title to its pro rata share of the water. (Ex. 3, File #2). 
In the decree dated March 24, 1950, appears the follow-
ing significant provision: 
'' . . . 8. That the new Alta Ditch and Canal 
Company has acquired no title in, or to, the said 
Alta ditch or water and has no right to control or 
3 
liquidate said property or rights beyond that 
which may be accorded to it by common consent 
of the persons interested, the right to regulate 
and administer the property for the purposes of 
liquidation remaining with the old corporation 
until its winding up in accordance "''1th the pro-
vision of this decree ... '' Exhibit 3. 
It is clear that in 1950, two years after the appellant 
purchased hi,s stock, Alta (the new Alta referred to in 
the decree). had ... "acquired no title in or to, the said 
Alta ditch •or water .... and had no rig,ht to control or 
I 
liquidate its property ... bey1ond that which may be 
accorded to it by common consent of the persons inter-
ested .... " (Emphasis added). 
In the meantime, before the entry of the decree quoted 
from above the appellant met with the City Council of 
Orem City on October 12, 1949, and made arrangements 
to have bis proportionate part of the water of Alta 
Spring delivered to him through the Orem City 14-inch 
pipeline which carries the City'.s share of Alta Spring 
water from the spring, a distance ·of several miles to the 
City where it is used for municipal purposes. The min-
utes of the October 12, 1949 meeting are as follows: 
''Dean E. Park was present to ask the Council 
to consider him tapping the 14-inch pipeline as 
proposed from the basin to the diversion unit just 
above the storage tank and running a line to his 
bowl for irrigation purposes. Mr. Park owns two 
shares of Alta Water and wished to have the 
City include his water with theirs and use it in 
regular turns each week, taking out the equiva-
lent of two shares from the pipeline through a 
4 
meter and if more water is used then he would be 
charged for it. He was told that it wa·s felt that 
the project could be worked out by a State Engi-
neer and the City Engineer and that it would 
prohably be agreeable v.rith the Council.'' 
Three days after the meeting of October 12, 1949, 
(Ex. 12) ·work on the facility to connect the appellant's 
\rnter line with the Orem line began (Tr. 66, 67). Orem 
City Engineer Beckman at the direction of the Orem 
City Council designed the works and supervised con-
struction (Tr. 11, 12, 29). From 1949 to the date of filing 
this suit the appellant diverted his share of Alta Spring 
water through the Orem City pipeline to his system con-
structed at an expense exceeding $24,000.00 (Tr. 64, 83). 
At the time of the construction of the appellant's 
eonnection facilities mentioned above, the appellant was 
at the site with James Ferguson, president of Alta and 
Jlerrill Crandall and Howard Ferguson, directors. (Tr. 
67, 68) .• Tames Ferguson testified that he recalled the 
meeting at the connection site, testified that he had known 
all about the appellant's pipeline and the fact that he 
had been getting Alta Spring water since 1949. (Tr. 167, 
168, 171). 
The appellant's pipeline was replaced with a larger 
diameter line in 1958 and a meter was installed. (Tr. 66, 
7 4, 75). The record discloses no other changes in the 
system during the seventeen-year period from 1949 to 
1966. Between 1949 and 1966 Alta made no objection to 
the diversion of appellant's water through the pipeline. 
(Tr. 76). He received a constant flow. (Tr. 151, 152). 
5 
The minutes of the City Council indicate no Orem 
transaction with appellant from October 12, 1949 to 
October 3, 1960. In a meeting on the last mentioned date 
the appellant's water connection was mentioned and it 
was "tabled for further research." (Ex. 12, p. 2). The 
minutes for May 8, 1961, show that the appellant ap-
peared at the City Council meeting and reported his 
arrangement with the City for the connection. (Ex. 12, 
pp. 2, 3). On July 17, 1961, the City Council directed its 
attorney, Mr. Wentz, to draw up a formal contract with 
appellant. (Ex. 12, p. 3). 
Mr. Wentz was called as a witness by the appellant. 
He produced a draft of an agreement which was offered 
and received in evidence. (Ex. 27). It provides that the 
appellant would transfer his water right and pipeline 
system to Orem City, and that upon such transfer he 
would take from the Orem City pipeline the quantity of 
water represented by his two shares of stock. If he di-
verted any water in excess of his entitlement he would 
pay for it. Mr. Wentz testified that the draft of contract 
was presented to the appellant but he refused it. (Tr. 
179). The appellant denied that he had ever seen it. (Tr. 
184). 
The record is uncontradicted that Orem City did not 
bill the appellant for water from 1949 to August 1, 1966, 
(except for one bill in 1961 for $7.50 about which there 
is a controversy (Tr. 73, 74, 241, 242). Frank Ferguson, 
Orem City employee, testified that he had read the ap-
pellant's water meter regularly from 1960 to 1967. (Tr. 
257-259) 
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M cier readings on the appellant's pipeline since 1962 
are in evidence (Ex. 38) and records of the yield of Alta 
Spring are in evidence. (Ex. 11) Mr. Beckman, former 
City Engineer of Orem testified that based on the records 
in eviden('e he caleulateu that during the period of 
measurement the appellant had diverted through his 
pipeline 18,024,759 gallons less than his entitlement from 
Alta Spring. (Tr. 276-278). This excess went down the 
pipeline to the Orem City system. (Tr. 276) 
In 1956 Orem and Alta entered into a written agree-
ment for the leasing to Orem of all of Alta's Alta Spring 
water. (Ex. 4). 
In 1958 Alta and Orem entered into an agreement by 
the terms of which Alta agreed to exchange its part of 
Alta Spring's summer water for Deer Creek Reservoir 
water plus a cash consideration. (Ex. 5). This was re-
newed in 1966. (Ex. 6). 
In 1964 an additional agreement was made by the 
two parties reciting that "Orem and Alta are owners as 
tenants in common of Alta Springs, ditch, pipeline, right 
of use of waters and works, Orem being the owner of 
34.8% and Alta being the owner of 65.18% of the same 
with Orem also owning 41 shares of Alta Stock in said 
65.18%. '' The parties agreed to jointly expend some 
$~l2,000.00 to cover Alta Spring. (Ex. 31). 
The summer water exchange agreement (Ex. 5) ex-
pireu by its terms on November 1, 1965. W'lien the irri-
gation season commenced in 1966 there was no exchange 
7 
agreement in effect and the stockholders in Alta received 
their pro-rata share of the spring water in turns. The 
water master, Cecil Ferguson, delivered appellant's 
water represented by his two shares into his pipeline 
to give him cullinary water. (Tr. 295, 296). The exchange 
agreement was later renewed. (Ex. 6). 
The appellant, in his amended complaint, alleges 
ownership of two shares of stock in Alta which entitle 
him to that proportion of the water of Alta Spring which 
his share bears to the total number of shares outstanding 
and to a right to carry his share of the water through 
Alta's ditches, pipelines and other facilities. He further 
alleges the construction of his pipeline at great expense 
to connect to the Orem City line, the connection arrange-
ment with Orem City and the other ultimate facts sum-
marized above. (R. 49-53). Alta answered denying the 
allegations relating to the water rights of the appellant 
and counterclaimed for a decree declaring the validity of 
the lease and exchange agreements mentioned above. 
(R. 69-72). Orem denied that the appellant was entitled 
to carry water in the Orem City pipeline or bad any 
rights therein and counterclaimed for back water pay-
ments and injunctive relief. (R. 60-68) 
The trial court made a judgment dismissing the ap-
pellant's amended complaint, declaring the validity of 
Alta's lease and exchange agreements and holding that 
the appellant's rights against Alta were only ,as the owner 
of two shares of stock. (R. 96-97). A's to Orem, the court 
found in effect that the appellant has no right to use or 
8 
mai11 tain his connection with the Orem City pipeline or 
to convey water through the said pipeline or its other 
diversion works or conveyance facilities. The court de-
nied to Orem City the right to rec·over the reasonable 
value of water delivered to appellant during the period 
November 1, 1962 to October 1, 1967. (R. 97). This appeal 
is from the judgment dismissing the amended complaint. 
Orem City has appealed from the adverse ruling on the 
counterclaim. (R. 107) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The appellant i's the owner of a right to use his 
proportionate share of the water of Alta Spring. 
2. The holder of stock in a mutual vrnter company is 
entitled to receive his proportionate share of the water 
and the majority ha,s no right over his objection to sell, 
exchange or ·otherwise deprive him of it. 
3. Alta did not, by the water lease and exchange 
agreement, have authority to deprive the appellant of his 
right to use Alta Spring water without his consent. 
4. Alta is estopped from interfering with the appel-
lant's water supply. 
5. The appellant has a valid and enforceable agree-
ment with Orem for the use of its pipeline and facilities 
for the carriage of his Alta Spring water. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE APPELLANT IS THE U\VNER OF A 
RIGHT TO USE HIS PROPORTIONATE SHARE OI•' 
THE WATER OF ALTA SPRING. 
The appellant contended at the trial that he has been 
' 
since acquiring two shares of stock in Old Alta, the 
owner of his proportionate share of that corporation's 
water rights and facilities. Old Alta organized in 1893 
was a typical mutual irrigation company. The water 
rights of its stockholders were pooled for more conveni-
ent distribution of water. The factual situation became 
complicated by the expiration of the Charter of Old Alta 
in 1943 and the organization of Alta with the same name 
and articles of incorporation in 1946. See Exhibits 7 and 
26. 
The appellant bought Certificate No. 224 from one 
Robert B. Calder in 1948. Calder's certificate was trans-
ferred in 1947 from the certificate ·of Verena C. Crandall, 
No. 213, dated in 1945. This certificate was issued from 
Certificate No. 202 dated November 4, 1943. (Ex. 13). It 
is clear from the evidence that the appellant's certificate 
represents an interest in the defunct corporation; al-
though it was not purchased until after the old corporate 
charter expired and the new corporation was organized. 
In 1950, two years after the appellant purchased his 
certificate, a decree was entered in a suit entitled," Orem 
City v. Alta Ditch and Canal Co., No. 15460' ',filed in the 
District Court of Utah County, which involved tl1e ques-
10 
tion as to whether Orem City, a stockholder in the de-
funct AJta Ditch Co., was entitled to its proportionate 
share of the water of the same Alta Spring as is now 
inYolved in this case. The eutire file is in evidence. (Ex. 
:1). It will be noted that Orem City won its case and the 
court quieted its title to its pro rata share of the water. 
Tn the decree dated March 24, 1950, appears the follow-
iug significant provision: 
'' ... 8. That the new Alta Ditch and Canal Com-
pany has acquired no title in, or to, the said Alta 
ditch or water and has no right to control or 
liquidate said property or rights beyond that 
which may be accorded to it by common consent 
of the persons interested, the right to regulate 
and administer the pr·operty for the purposes of 
liquidation remaining with the old corporation 
until its ·winding up in accordanc~e with the pro-
vision of this decree ... '' Exhibit 3. 
It is clear that in 1950, two years after the appellant 
had purchased his stock, the new Alta had ''acquired no 
title in, or to, the said Alta ditch or water" and had no 
iight to control or liquidate its property "beyond that 
which may be accorded to it by common consent of the 
persons interested .... " (Emphasis added). 
The testimony of James Ferguson is uncontradicted 
that s·ince 1950 no transfer of water rights has been 
made from the old Alta to the new Alta. (Tr. 172). It is 
also uncontradicted that appellant has mar1e no convey-
ance of water rights in Alta since the entry of the decree 
in 1950. (Tr. 72) 
11 
Thus, the appellant has two bases for his claim to 
ownership of his pro rata share of Alta Spring water, 
both based upon ownership of Certificate No. 224, (1) his 
position as successor to a stockholder in the old corpora-
tion, and (2) his position as a shareholder in a mutual 
irrigation company. 
2. THE HOLDER OF STOCK IN A MUTUAL 
WATER COMP ANY ]S ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 
HIS PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE \V ATER, 
AND THE MAJORITY HAS NO RIGHT OVER HIS 
OBJECTION TO SELL, EXCHANGE, OR OTHER-
1VISE DEPRIVE HIM OF IT. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held in a fong line 
of cases, going back nearly 60 years, that a mutual water 
company is not like an ordinary business corporation. 
A mutual company is essentially a corporate water mas-
ter. It is created normally to manage, distribute and 
control the water. -While it may take legal title to the 
water right, the equitable title remains in the stockhold-
ers. Thus, stock in a mutual company is not treated as 
personal property, but it is frequently held to be appur-
tenant to land. The stockholders are tenants in common 
of the water, and it was never contemplated that the 
eorporation would have the authority to sell the water 
right or otherwise deprive any other stockholder of his 
proportionate share of the water. At the outset, we direct 
the court's attention to the corporate purpose, as stated 
in the articles. In thi,s regard the articles of the old Alta 
Ditch and the articles of the new Alta Ditch are the same, 
12 
and this corporate pur]Jose clearly constitutes each of 
these eompanics a tn:ic:\l \Ve:-;1<>111 nwtual water rom-
pany. The artides provide: 
"That the object, business m1<l 1mrsuit of said 
Corporation is, and sli<ill eonii11ue to be, to carry 
on and conduct the business of making working 
and maintainiug ditehes aw1 canals and water-
ways, and particularly the ''A Ha Ditch and 
Canal'' for the c-mT~ i11g mid comlucting of water 
for the irrigation of la11(Li, farms, orchards and 
gardens, for the use of and propelling ·of ma-
ehinery fm mill and rninii1:~· purposes, and any, 
every and all other nsei'nl and la1vful purposes 
for which sueh ditches, cauals, or reservoirs and 
water can or may be used.'' (See Article IV, Ex. 
26, and Article III gx. 7) 
There are many cases from the Utah Supreme Court 
which make the distinction noted ahove. ln East River 
Bottom v. Boyce, 102 Utah 14-9, 128 P. 2cl '277 (1942), the 
court noted that the only legal basis npou which stock 
could he is·sued in a nm tual company was by signing the 
articles and presumptively upon a showing that such 
person was the o\vner of a 1va te t' right which he could 
exchang·e for the stock. I11 that case the co;:npany had 
originally issued Certificate No. 7, representing 7 shares 
of stock. Later a pnrchaser of tlwt stot:k, without sur-
rendering it to the compally, induced tbe company to 
is.sue iu lieu thereof Certiftrnte :t\o . ."J(i. 'Clrns, two sep-
arate eertificates were ontstanc1inb: each representing 
the same seven share::; of ·stock. Ultimately the entire 14 
shares were deli·,'ered to a bm1k as security for a loan. 
The water rompany theH 1 ook tlle position that 7 shares 
13 
had been erroneously issued, au<l were void. In upholding 
the irrigation company's position the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the mutual irrigation company had only 
the power and authority to manage, control and distri-
bute the water; that the company could not issue a cer-
tificate of stock without receiving a water right in ex-
change therefor. Said the court: 
The corporation was a loose sort of a mutual 
agreement for the unifed management and dis-
tribution ·of the water to the owners. The limited 
and restrictive words for the purpose of ''con-
trol, management and distribution'' is not a con-
veyance ,separating a water right appurtenant to 
land from the land and does not vest the title or 
right of use in the corporation within the provi-
si,ons ·of Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, Seotion 
100-1-10 and 18e'Ction 100-1-11. The company has 
power or authorHy only to manage, control and 
distribute the water. The water right was never 
severed from the land and is still appurtenant 
thereto. An examination of the articles of agree-
ment to determine what a stock certificate repre-
sented would, either for inve1stment or loan 
purposes disclose what the certificate actually rep-
resented. There is no power of assessment in the 
original article. The annual expenses were to be 
submitted to the stockholders and when the pro-
portion of each one was de·termined he was not to 
be permittted to use water until his pr,o rata share 
of the expenses were paid. 
The only legal basis upon which stock could be 
issued in the company was by signing the articles 
of incorporation and agreeing to the method of 
distribution and control and presumptively upo11 
14 
a showing that such person was the owner of a 
u'ater right in the Provo River as sho·wn by the 
decree ref erred to in the articles of incorporation. 
The stock certificates constitute a declaration 
of the proportion of the water to be distributed 
to the persons to whom they were originally is-
sued upon which regulations for distribution were 
based. (Emphasis added) 
See also Continental National Bank v. Minersville 
ResPrvoir and Irrigation Co., 73 Utah 243, 273 P. 502 
(1928) where the court, after noting the particular arti-
cles of incorporation, held that the only method by which 
anyone could acquire stock in the oompany was to ex-
change a water right for the stock, and that an over issue 
of stock not in consideration for a water right was void. 
In Smithfield lVest Bendt Irrigation Co. v. Union Cen-
tral Life Insu-rooce Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 P. 2d 866 
(1943), the court expres·sly said that a mutual company 
cannot sell any of the water without the consent of the 
stockholders or for non-payment of dues. This case in-
vulved only the water reaching the end of the canal. The 
court, in recognizing the aforegoing principle said: 
The waters of a mutual irrigation company be-
long to the users, the company being merely a 
distributing and apportioning trustee. Such was 
the Logan Northern Company. The water con-
trolled by it may be used by any shareholders, 
subject only to the regulation thereof by the com-
pany for the benefit of the shareholders so none 
shall be deprived of his rights by the others. 
The company cannot sell any of the water with-
15 
out the co11se11t of the stockholders wr for non-
payment of dues if the articles of 'incorporation 
make the stock liable for such costs and expenses. 
Likewise the company c..:annot permit the water to 
be lost by 11011-use tl1ereof as long as any share-
holder desires to and is in a position to use the 
water. \Vate1· m1distrilmted may be used by any 
stockholder in a position to use it. The share-
holders are in effect ovvners in common of the 
·waters with certain limitations as between one 
another goYerning the use thereof. Each may c ~ • 
therefore use any water not being used by any 
other shareholder, as is the case with other own-
ers in common. Hough v. Porter, 51 Or. 318, 95 
P. 732, 98 P. 1083, 102 P. 728; Stephens v. Beall, 
22 Wall 329, 22 L. Ed. 786; Bu.rbank v. Crooker, 
7 Gray Mass., 158, 66 Am. Dec. 470; Tuttle v. 
Campbell, 74 Mich. G52, 42 N. \Y. 384, 16 Am. St. 
Rep. 652: Mullins v. Bidtf Hardware Co., 25 Mont. 
G25, 65 P. 1004, 87 Am. St. Rep. 430; Bergere v. 
Chaves, 14 N. M. 352, 9::3 P. 762, 51 A. L. R., N. S., 
50, affirmed in Cllau:s v. Bc1·gere, 231 U. S. 482, 
34 S. Ct. 144, 58 L. Ed. 325. 
In Genofo v. Santaquin City, 9G Utah 88, 80 P. 2d 930 
(1938), the court said that a stockholr1er in a mutual com-
pany has "a right to demand and receive his aliquot 
share of the water being distributed by the company in 
the proportion that his stock bears to all stock.'' The 
court said that, "Water rights arc pooled in a mutual 
company for the convenience of operation and more 
efficient distribution, and perhaps for more convenient 
transfer. But the stock certifirate is not like the stock 
certificate in a compan~· operated. for profit. It is really 
a certificate showing an undi,·ic1crl part ownership in a 
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"eriain water supply. It embraces the right to call for 
::;uch undivided part according to the method of distribu-
tion.'' 
The court recently quoted with approval from this 
holding in St. George City v. Kirkland, et al, 17 Utah 2d 
292, 409 P. 2d 970 (1966). 
In Salt Lake City v. East Jordwn Irrigation Co., 40 
LJtah 126, 121 P. 592 (1911), the Supreme Court applied 
these principles in a damage suit. Salt Lake City had 
condemned the right to enlarge the existing canal of the 
irrigation companies. The court was concerned with 
whether or not the irrigation company could collect for 
the damages suffered by the individual stockholders 
while the water was out of the canal. The Supreme Court 
held that the company could not make such a recovery, 
and in so holding said : 
·while the water users who are also stock-
holders of the respondent undoubtedly will be 
bound by any judgment that may be rendered in 
this proceeding so far as it in any way affects the 
rights of the respondent as a corporate entity and 
as it may affect the stockholders as such, yet the 
stockholders cannot be bound in case appellant 
invades what is purely the privab right of the 
stockholder, and in that way damages him in a 
matter which does not affect the corporation. The 
corporation does not represent the stockholder in 
his private rights or affairs, and hence cannot bind 
him, although it seeks to do so in an action ·or pro-
ceeding to which he is not a party. Let us apply the 
foregoing principle to this case. Assuming that 
A. as a stockholder of respondent, and a water 
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user under the canal, has 500 head of cattle whi<'li 
must be watered daily; tLat in entering upon the 
canal and enlarging it appellant so interferes 
with the diversion of the water from the canal 
that A. cannot obtain any water therefrom, and 
is compelled to obtain water for his cattle else-
where for the space of a week or ten days, or until 
appellant has again placed all of the diverting 
appliances in place, so that A. may again obtain 
water as before, and that A., by reason of having 
to obtain water elsewhere or for any other reas'Oll 
directly attributable to appellant's interference 
with the diversion 1of water, is damaged to the ex-
tent of $500, assuming now that respondent re-
ceives these damages in this proceeding and turns 
the same into its treasury - how will A. obtain 
recompense for his injuries? Again may it not be, 
indeed, would it not be almost impos·sible to be 
otherwise than, that some stockholders as water 
users are damaged more than others, and that the 
damages, if any, may not all be controlled or gov-
erned by the amount of stock any one of them 
holds in the corporation~ If, therefore, the re-
spondent is permitted to prove and recover any 
special damages that any individual stockholder 
may suffer, then 1such stockholders as may not 
have suffered any damages may nevertheless he 
benefited by receiving out of the treasury of 
respondent a portion of the damages that are 
suffered by the other stockholders. In other words, 
the corporation is permitted to recover for the 
benefit of all the stockholders that which only a 
few may have suffered, and where no two may 
have suffered to the same extent. For the fore-
going reasons we think the rule that a judgment 
ap.·ainst the corporation binds the stockholder only 
in matters which directly affect the corporation 
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in its rights and liabilities is manifestly sound. 
Upon both the questions involved in special find-
ings 2 and 3, therefore, we think the evidence 
should be confined to matters which may affect 
and damage the corporation in its rights, since 
such special damages as will be •suffered by the 
individual stockholders in their individual rights 
cannot be adjusted in this proceeding, since the 
proceeding is intended to fix and adjudicate the 
damages respondent will suffer, and not those 
that others may sustain who are not parties to 
the proceeding. It would be unjust to require 
appellant to pay to respondent what belongs to 
another, and especially in a case where the loss 
can only be ascertained when the rights of such 
other ar·e interfered with. We are clearly of the 
opinion, therefore, that the trial court proceeded 
upon a wrong theory with regard to the measure 
of damages. 
This principle was recently considered in Gwwnison-
Fayette Canal Co. v. Gunnison Irrigation Co., Case No. 
11209, decided December 5, 1968, and not yet reported. 
The court, by a three-two decision, permitted the irriga-
tion company to collect damages for loss of water, but 
the majority in so holding stated that the suit was not 
brought for damage to crops, but rather for the loss of 
water, and that if the plaintiff corporation recovered for 
the value of the water, it would hold the proceeds of the 
judgment in trust for its stockholders. 
In re. Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 748 
(1924) quoted with approval from an Idaho case Ireton 
v. Idaho Irr. Co., 30 Idaho 310, 164 Pac. 687) as follows: 
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"It is contended by appellant that the shares 
of stock in the operating company are personal 
property, and that the water right passed by 
assignment of them, and did not become subject 
to the mortgage on the land. vVhile shares of stock 
in an ordinary corporation, organized for profit, 
are personal property (section 2747, Rev. Codes; 
State v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho, 784, and cases therein 
cited on page 802, 156 Pac. 1141), and while this 
court has held shares in an irrigation company to 
be personal property (Watson v. Molden, 10 
Idaho, 570, 79 Pac. 503 ), the fact must not be lost 
sight of that a water right is, as heretofore shown, 
real estate, and that in case of a mutual irriga-
tion company, not organized for profit, but for 
the convenience of its members in the manage-
ment of the irrigation system and in the distribu-
tion to them of water for use upon their lands in 
proportion to their respective interests, owner-
ship of shares of stock in the corporation is but 
incidental to ownership of a water right. Such 
shares are muniments of title to the water right, 
are inseparable from it, and ownership of them 
passes with the title which they evidence. In re 
Thomas' Estate, 147 Cal. 236, 81 Pac. 539; Berg 
v. Yakima Valley Canal Co., 83 Wash. 451, 145 
Pac. 619, L. R. A. 1915D, 292." 
The court also quoted with approval from a Cali-
fornia case Woodstone M. & T. Co. v. Durnsmore C. W. 
Co., 47 Cal. App. 72, 190 Pac. 213, as follows: 
"V\There the owners of water rights appurte-
nant to their several tracts of land formed a 
mutnal corporation and transferred their water 
rigMs to the corporation in exchange for stock 
representing the right to water, the water right 
remained appurtenant to the land notwithstand-
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ing the formal change in ownership and passed 
to a mortgagee of the land and appurtenant water 
rights as against a subsequent execution buyer 
of the ·stock which still stood on the cornorate 
books in the name of the mortgagor." L 
The court noted a Utah case (George v. Rob·ison, 23 
Utah 79, 63 Pac. 819, 1901) and said that its decision was 
based largely upon the argument that shares of stock 
representing the water rights in question were personal 
property, and said: 
''But we think the rule is not absolute, and 
should not apply to shares of stock in an irriga-
tion company which is not organized for profit 
but for the convenience of owners of water rights 
in the regulation and distribution of the water to 
which they are entitled. This distinction was not 
considered in the opinion of the court and there 
were other controlling factors in the case, for 
which reason the general rule there expressed 
should be modified, when applied to a case like the 
one at bar.'' 
In Arnold v. 0. & R. Association, 64 Utah 534, 231 
P. 622, (1924) the court, in commenting on the rights of 
stockholders in a mutual company, said: 
Counsel, however, overlooks the all-important 
fact that the members of the defendant, as water 
users, stand on precisely the same footing, and 
that each one is entitled to his proportion or pro 
rata share ·of water that is fit for irrigation and 
domestic and culinary use. There are no primary 
or secondary rights with regard to those water 
users. If counsel's contention should prevail, the 
members receiving water out of the Huntington 
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canal and the North ditch would ·obtain the use of 
water which is fit for the purposes aforesaid, 
while those farther down the stream would have 
to be content with water that is totally unfit for 
use. The lower water users ·would thus be de-
prived of the use of water. Only a part of defen-
dant's members would thus be ·served with water 
responding to their needs. If, therefore, there is 
seepage water, which, through no fault of the 
lower water users, is made unfit for use, and for 
that reason must be permitted to run to waste, 
each one of the defendant's members must bear 
his proportionate share of the lo·ss. No other con-
clusion is permissible or defensible. 
In the case of Baird v. Upper Canal and Irrigation 
Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060 (1927), a petition for a writ 
of mandamus was filed to compel a corporation to permit 
a stockholder to connect her pipeline to the corporation 
water system. The district court granted the writ of 
mandamus and the water company appealed. The cor-
poration refused to permit the shareholder to make the 
desired connection because the stockholder proposed to 
take the water from the area irrigated by the corpora-
tion canal system. 
It was held that where a stockholder sought to compel 
a corporation to permit her to connect her pipeline to 
the corporation water system that in absence of any ar-
rangement to the contrary the water in the mutual 
corporation must be delivered to the stockholder in pro-
portion to the stock owned and that the corporation could 
not refuse to deliver water merely because the stock-
holder desired to use the water in an area outside of the 
22 
area embraced within the irrigation system of the water 
corporation. The Board of Directors owes the duty to 
distribute to each stockholder his proper proportion of 
water available for distribution. 
The case.s cited above clearly support the appellant's 
µosition that he is the owner, by virtue of his stock own-
ership of his aliquot share of the water of Alta Spring. 
The trial court erred in holding, in effect, that the ap-
pellant did not own such share of spring water, but that 
all the water belonged to Alta, and could be dispo.sed of 
by that company as it Baw fit. That the trial court erred 
in so holding is clear, because there has never been a 
conveyance of title of the water right from the old Alta 
Ditch fo the new Alta Ditch, (See the testimony of James 
J<,erguson Tr. 172) and because even assuming such oon-
veyance, both companies were mutual irrigation com-
panies. They were only corporate water masters with 
the power to manage and distribute the water. The com-
pany had no such right as would permit it to exchange 
the appellant '·s share of the pure spring water for water 
not suited for domestic use. 
3. ALTA DID NOT, BY THE WATER LEASE 
AND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT HAVE AUTHOR-
ITY TO DEPRIVE THE APPELLANT OF HIS 
RIGHT TO USE ALTA SPRING WATER WITHOUT 
HIS CONSENT. 
The appellant having established a water right in 
Alta Spring, it is clear that such right could not be con-
tracted away without his consent. 
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The exchange agreements between Alta and Orem 
covering both the summer water and the \vinter water 
are in evidence. Exhibits 4, 5 and G. The obvious pur-
pose of the exchange was to make available to Orem 
the superior quality spring water. (Tr. 222, 223) The 
testimony of Engineer Brown, \vitness for the defend-
ants, is that Alta Spring water as now gathered, trans-
ported and treated meets public health standards, and 
that water pumped out of the end of the Alta ditch is 
contaminated. (Tr. 226). 
The testimony of Cecil Ferguson, water master and 
witness for Alta, is definite that the only water not in-
volved in the exchange with Orem is the Orem City 
water and the water represented by the appellant's two 
shares of stock. (Tr. 295, 296). The appellant testified 
that since 1949, without interruption, he has diverted 
water out of the Orem pipeline for use on his property 
which includes domestic use in his home, livestock water 
and water for irrigation sprinkling. By practice over 
nearly 20 years, the appellant's water has been effectually 
severed from the remainder of the Alta water, and the 
appellant has enjoyed use of his water through a sepa-
rate system for a purpose different from the irrigation 
purpose which Deer Creek water will just as well serve. 
(Tr. 76, 83, 151, 152). 
There is no evidence that the appellant consented to 
the water lease and exchange agreements or in any 
manner ratified them. The checks representing the divi-
dends which were sent to him have been promptly re-
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turned to Alta with the correct comment that they did 
not belong to him. (Tr. 95, 96). The appellant has always 
recei,·ed hiH water without question, and in fact, the 
water master, Cecil Ferguson, during an interim period 
between the expiration of the old agreement and its re-
newal, arranged for the interruption of irrigation turns 
to assure a steady supply of water for the appellant 
through the Orem City pipeline. (Tr. 295, 296). Mr. Fer-
guson testified that it was the practice to measure the 
Alta Spring water at the head house. At times when the 
water was diverted at the head house, the Orem water 
and the appellant's water represented by his two shares 
went down the Orem City pipeline. Orem got all of the 
appellant's water which was not diverted to his proper-
ty. (Tr. 296). 
Absent consent of the appellant, Alta could not con-
trad away the water right of the appellant in Alta 
Spring which had by common consent and practice been 
given a separate status. This is the case whether this 
right of the appellant is a part of the water belonging 
to Old Alta, or a proportionate part of the water being 
(listributed by common consent by the new Alta. 
4. ALTA ]S ESTOPPED FROM INTERFERING 
\\'ITH THE APPELLANT'S -WATER SUPPLY. 
There is no conflict in the evidence as to the facts 
and circumstances under which the appellant's pipeline 
system was construeted. It is alleged in the Amended 
Complaint in paragraph 9 that the defendants and each 
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of them have, since 1949, acquiesced in the diversion of 
Alta Spring water by the appellant and have stood by 
while he expended a large sum of money for his water 
system. (R. 51). This allegation was denied. (R. 62, 71). 
The appellant testified that in 1949 he was at the site. 
while the diversion from the Orem line was being con-
structed in the company of Jim Ferguson, Merrill Cran-
dall and Howard Ferguson. (Tr. 67, 68). Mr. Ferguson 
was then and still is the president of Alta. (Tr. 163). He 
was also president of Old Alta. (Tr. 171). Howard Fer-
guson, who was also a director, made a deal to rent 1% 
shares of the appellant's water with the understanding 
that the other % share would run down the pipeline to 
supply the appellant's ·stockwatering and irrigation 
needs. (Tr. 64, 69). The arrangement lasted for seven 
years and then a similar deal was made with appellant's 
'''1.tness, Richard P. Anderson, for one year. (1957). (Tr. 
65, 156). 
Mr. James Ferguson, Alta president, recalled the 
meeting at the diversion site, testified that he had known 
all about the appellant'.s pipeline and the fact that he 
had been getting Alta Spring water since 1949. (Tr. 167, 
169). There could be no better proof of knowledge, ac-
quiescence, and expenditure of large sums of money in 
reliance on Alta's .special treatment of the appellant's 
water entitlements than appears in the record in this 
case. The rule of equitable estoppel must be applied to 
prevent manifest injustice. 
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-That knowledge of an officer of a corporation is at-
tributed to a corporation is settled law. rrhis rule applies 
even though the knowledge is not communicated to the 
corporation. 
19 C.J.S. p. 613, section 1078. 
Pacific Digest, Key 482. 
Strohecker v. Mutual Bldg. ct Loa;n Ass'n., 55 
Nev. 350, 34 P.2d 1076. 
Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat. Bldg. Co., 
89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099. 
The rule on equitable estoppel is stated as follows: 
"A person who, with knowledge of the facts 
and of his rights acquiesces in or ratifies an act 
or transaction is estopped to repudiate such act 
or transaction as against one who is misled to his 
prejudice." 31 C.J.S., page 589, section 114. 
The rule is stated in Pomeroy's Equity Jurispru-
dence, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2, page 1680, section 818 as 
follows: 
''Acquiescence consisting of mere silence may 
also operate as a true estoppel in equity to pre-
clude a party from asserting legal title and rights 
of property, real or personal, or rights of con-
tract. The requisites of such estoppel have been 
described. A fraudulent intention to deceive or 
mislead is not essential. All instances of this 
class, in equity, rest upon the principle: If one 
maintain silence when in conscience he ought to 
speak, equity will debar him from speaking when 
in conscience he ought to remain silent. A most 
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important application includes all eases \\·here a11 
owner of property, A, stands by and knowingh 
permits another person, B, to deal with the pro1;-
erty as though it were his, or as though he were 
rightfully dealing with it, without interposing 
any objection, as by expending money upon it, 
making improvements, erecting buildings, and 
the like ... " 
'11his species of estoppel applies to corporations in 
their dealings with third persons. 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence ,Vol. 2, page 
1681, section 819. 
5. THE APPELLANT HAS A VALID AND EN. 
FORCEABLE AGREEMENT WITH OREM FOR 
THE USE OF ITS PIPELINE AND FACILITIES 
FOR THE CARRIAGE OF HIS ALTA SPRING 
\YATER. 
Orem City and Metropolitan \Yater District of Orem 
were joined as defendants because they were parties to 
the water lease and exchange agreement affecting Alta 
Spring water. It will be noted that those agreements 
purport to lease and exchange all of the water distributed 
by Alita. Or·em contends that this included the appellant's 
water and that, therefore, the continued use of the 
water by him was illegal and he should pay for it. Orem 
City was also joined as a defendant because it has re· 
pudiated an agreement with the appellant for the use of 
the City pipeline. 
The history of the transaction between the appellant 
and Orem City is disclosed largely by the minutes of the 
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City Council of Orem City for the period from August 
30, rn48, to the date of the filing of the suit. The min-
utes of the meeting of October 12, 1949, arc very signifi-
cant because both Orem City and the appellant operated 
under them for some seventeen years before the present 
wit was filed. They read: 
''Dean E. Park was present to ask the Council 
to consider him tapping the 14-inch pipe line as 
proposed from the basin to the diversion unit just 
above the storage tank and running a line to his 
bowl for irrigation purposes. Mr. -Park owns two 
shares of Alta Water and wished to have the City 
include his water with theirs and use it in regular 
turns each week, taking out the equivalent of two· 
shares from the pipe line through a meter and if 
more water is used then he would be charged for 
it. He was told that it was felt that the project 
could be worked out by a State Engineer and the 
City Engineer and that it would probably be 
agreeable with the Council.'' 
Three days after the meeting of October 12, work on 
construction of the diversion began with City Engineer 
Beckman acting as the designer of the diversion works 
and the supervisor of construction. (Tr. 66, 67). From 
1949 to October 3, 1960, I find no minutes pertinent to 
the case. On October 3, 1960, the appellant's water con-
nection was mentioned and ''tabled for further re-
search." (Ex. 12, p. 2). On May 8, 1961, the minute.s show 
that the appellant appeared at the City Council meeting 
and reported the arrangement between him and the 
City, which report is substantially the same as bis testi-
mony in this case. (Ex. 12, pp. 2, 3). On July 17, 1961, 
the City Council decided to have a contract dra'.vn up be-
tween the appellant and Orem City and directed its at-
torney to proceed. (Ex. 12, p. 3). The minutes of Novem-
ber 4, 1963, disclose that Attorney Wentz was directed tu 
bring to the Council a copy of an agreement he had sent 
to the appellant for signing. (Ex. 12). 
Mr. Wentz was called by the appellant as a witness 
and he produced a draft of an agreement which was 
offered and received in evidence, which very significantly 
provided that the appellant would transfer to the City 
his water right and pipeline and would then be entitled 
to take the quantity of water represented by his two 
shares of Alta water out of the Orem line. He would pay 
for any quantity s·o taken in excess of the water entitle-
ment of the 2 shares. (Ex. 27). It will be noted that this 
was the substance of the minute of October 12, 1949, 
quoted above. 
Another significant fact confirming the arrangement 
is that Orem did not bill the appellant for water from 
1949 to August 1, 1966 (except for ·one bill for $7.50 
about which there is a conflict of testimony), (Tr. 73, 74), 
although Frank Fergu·son testified he had read the ap-
pellant's water meter regularly from 1960 to 1967. (Tr. 
257-259). If the appellant was just an ordinary water 
customer, why did the City fail to send a bill? The ob-
vious answer is that both parties were operating under 
the arrangement reflected in the minutes. 
The water was metered after 1958, and meter read-
ings of the water taken by the appellant since 1962 and 
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re0ords of measurements of the yield of Alta :Spring are 
in eYidence. (Ex. 11, 38, 39). 
Mr. Beckman, former City Engineer of Orem City, 
made cakula tions based on the measurements in the rec-
ord and testified that during the. period of measurement, 
the appellant diverted 18,024,757 gallons less than his 
entitlement from Alta Spring. (Tr. 276-278). This excess 
water went down the pipeline into the Orem City system. 
(Tr. 276). Based on City rates in evidence, the value of 
this water was substantial. 
CONCLUSION 
It must be concluded: 
1. The appellant owned a proportionate part of the 
water of. Alta Spring based on his ownership of two 
shares of stock in Old Alta. 
2. The appellant's wa:ter was not included in the 
water exchange between Orem and Alta, because he did 
not consent to lease or to exchange his part of the Alta 
Spring water. 
3. The appellant spent large sums of money to con-
nect to the Orem pipeline and to carry his water to the 
plaee of use ·with the knowledge and acquiescence of Alta. 
Alta is now estopped to deny the severance of appellant's 
\Yater from the ·other ·water of the company. 
4. Orem City and the appellant have an agreement 
1eli1 cted in the minutes that the appellant could carry 
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his Alta Spring water in the Orem City pipeline and 
would pay for water in excess of his entitlement as a 
shareholder in Alta. 
5. Orem City has had the use of more than 18,000,000 
gallons of appellant's water since 1962. 
6. The agreement for use of the Orem pipeline is 
valid and is in full force and effect. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court denying appellant the relief prayed for in his 
amended complaint should be reversed. 
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